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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the Eighth District Courtf s denial of 
Appellant's Motion for New Trial pursuant to 59(a)(7) U.R.C.P. on 
or about September 17, 1996 (R. 252-253) in reference to the 
District Court's prior August 7, 1996, denial (R. 198-200) of 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Issue of 
Liability and granting Defendant!s Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the issue of Liability as to the issues raised by Appellant's 
claims based upon § 63-30a-2, U.C.A, as amended. All other claims 
were dismissed pursuant to stipulation and Order of Dismissal 
entered October 11, 1996. (R. 256-257) Notice of Appeal was 
timely filed on or about October 11, 1996. (R. 258-259). 
The Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of this appeal 
under § 78-2-2(3)(j )
 / U.C.A., as amended. On or about December 9, 
1996, the Supreme Court poured this appeal over to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Rule 42 Utah R. App. P. The Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2) (j ), U.C.A., as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The question presented by this appeal is whether an officer or 
employee of a public entity, charged with criminal offenses in 
connection with or arising out of acts or omissions of that officer 
or employee during the performance of his duties, may recover 
attorney's fees from the public entity pursuant to § 63-30a-2, 
U.C.A., as amended, which are incurred in defense of charges 
dismissed on motion of the defense or upon which the individual is 
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acquitted, notwithstanding that the officer/employee may plead or 
be found guilty on remaining counts of a multi-count Information. 
("Ruling", R. 198-200; "Ruling", R. 252-253) 
B. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Lower court judgments rendered as a matter of law are subject 
to appellate review for correctness without giving deference to the 
lower court's conclusion. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 
920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996). 
Statutory interpretation is question of law which the Court of 
Appeals reviews for correctness, granting no deference to the trial 
court's determinations. Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 P. 2d 
1294, 1296 (Utah App. 1996). 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statute central to this appeal is § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., as 
amended, entitled "Indictment or information against officer or 
employee - Reimbursement of attorneys1 fees and court costs 
incurred in defense", and states in its entirety as follows: 
If a state grand jury indicts or if an information is 
filed against an officer or employee, in connection with 
or arising out of any act or omission of that officer or 
employee during the performance of his duties, within the 
scope of his employment or under color of his authority, 
and that indictment or information is quashed or 
dismissed or results in a judgment of acquittal, unless 
the indictment or information is quashed or dismissed 
upon application or motion of the prosecuting attorney, 
that officer or employee shall be entitled to recover 
from the public entity reasonable attorneys' fees and 
court costs necessarily incurred in the defense of that 
indictment or information. 
Other rules $md statutes which may be of central importance to 
determination of this appeal are the following. 
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Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is set forth in 
its entirety in the addendum hereto. It states in pertinent part, 
(b) " . • . .an indictment or information shall charge the 
offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted . . . " 
(d) ". . . after verdict, an indictment or information may be 
amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to 
bar subsequent prosecution . . ." 
(e) " when facts not set out in an information or 
indictment are required to inform a defendant of the nature and 
cause of the offense charged. . . . " 
The term "Information" pursuant to § 77-1-3, U.C.A., as 
amended, is defined as follows: 
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing 
charging a person with a public defense which is 
presented, signed and filed in the office of the clerk 
where the prosecution is commenced pursuant to § 77-2-
1.1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Loni DeLand, obtained an assignment of Sheriff 
Lloyd Meacham's claim for attorney's fees against Uintah County 
pursuant to § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., as amended, in relation to the 
defense of criminal charges lodged against Sheriff Meacham arising 
out of acts or omissions during the performance of his duties, 
within the scope of his employment or under color of his authority. 
(R. 89; R. 63) 
On or about March 6, 1996, Mr. DeLand brought an action 
against Uintah County (R. 1-8) for reimbursement of those 
attorney's fees based upon the assignment, as specifically set 
3 
forth in the Second Cause of Action of his Amended Complaint- (R. 
19-24) 
Mr, DeLand submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment as to the 
Issues of Liability and Damages as to Plaintiff's Second Cause of 
action on or about June 21, 1996. (R. 44-133). Uintah County 
responded on or about July 29, 1996 with a counter-motion entitled 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability. (R. 137-
197). 
The trial court made and entered its "Ruling" denying 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgement on the Issue of Liability 
and Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue 
of Liability, both in respect to the second cause of action of 
Appellant's First Amended Complaint on August 7, 1996. (R. 198-
200) A copy of the trial court's "Ruling" of August 7, 1996, 
granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is appended hereto 
as "Exhibit A". Mr. DeLand timely filed a Motion for "New 
Trial" Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) U.R.C.P. on or about August 15, 
1996, (R. 235-244), to which the County responded (R. 247-251) on 
or about September 13, 1996. The Trial Court issued its "Ruling" 
denying Appellant's motion for new trial on or about September 17, 
1996 reaffirming its August 7th "Ruling". (R. 252-253). A copy 
of the trial court's "Ruling" of September 17, 1996 denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial is appended hereto as "Exhibit B". 
The parties stipulated to dismissal of the Appellant's 
remaining claims for relief (R. 254-255) and pursuant thereto the 
Trial Court's Order of Dismissal of Plaintiff's First and Third 
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Causes of Action Without Prejudice was made and entered on or about 
October 11, 1996, thus disposing of all remaining claims and 
issues. (R. 256-257) 
Thereafter, from the trial court's "Ruling" of September 17, 
1996 the Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on or about October 
11, 1996. (R. 258-259). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
As to the sole issue presented herein with respect to 
liability of Uintah County pursuant to 63-30a-2, U.C.A., as 
amended, there are no material factual disputes between the 
parties. As reflected in the Trial Court's August 7, 1996, Ruling 
(R. 198-200) granting Uintah County's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the Issue of Liability, 
"The essential facts necessary to decide this case are 
not in dispute. Those facts are set forth in separate 
paragraph numbers in Plaintiff's Memorandum and will not 
be reincorporated in this Ruling. It should be noted 
that the parties have essentially agreed as to those 
facts except for the reasonableness or the amount of the 
fees and the fact the representatives of Uintah County 
had previously acknowledged that compensation would be 
appropriate." (R. 200) 
Those material undisputed facts before the trial court are set 
forth as follows. 
Lloyd D. Meacham was the Uintah County Sheriff in October of 
1993. (R. 91) On or about October 10, 1993, a six count 
Information was filed in the Eighth District Court by the office of 
the Attorney General for the State of Utah, Criminal no. 931800490 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the criminal case") alleging 
three third degree felony counts of misuse of public money, 
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specifically that the defendant, Lloyd D. Meacham, "...while 
sheriff of Uintah County, a public officer, knowingly made a profit 
out of public monies and/or used the same for a purpose not 
authorized by law, " in violation of § 76-8-404, and 202, and 
Article 13, Section 8, of the Utah State Constitution; and three 
class B misdemeanor counts of falsification or alteration of 
government documents. (R. 91; Information, Criminal no. 
931800490, R. 75-78) 
Shortly thereafter Appellant, Loni DeLand, a member in good 
standing of the Utah State Bar and experienced criminal defense 
lawyer, undertook the representation of Sheriff Meacham with 
respect to the charges contained in the Information for the 
specified retainer amount of $7,500.00, against which Mr. DeLand 
agreed he would charge his normal and usual fees and costs and bill 
Mr. Meacham for the remainder over and above that amount. Mr. 
Meacham never paid the retainer although he was billed for all 
services rendered. (R. 91-93) 
In his representation of Sheriff Meacham, among various 
defense functions, Mr. DeLand undertook to conduct interviews; 
review transcripts of meetings; travel from Salt Lake City to 
Vernal several times; represent Sheriff Meacham at a preliminary 
hearing on or about February 10, 1994, from which Sheriff Meacham 
was bound over to stand trial in the District Court (Docket, 
Criminal no. 931800490, R. 79-85, at 82); confer with 
representatives of the Attorney General's office; prepare for 
anticipated trial; prepare a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in 
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Support of a Motion to Dismiss; argue the Motion to Dismiss before 
the District Court; et cetera. (R. 89-90) 
As counsel for Sheriff Meacham, Mr. DeLand moved for the 
District Court to dismiss the three felony counts as a matter of 
law based upon the established facts as preserved in the transcript 
of preliminary hearing. The motion was fully briefed and argued on 
or about April 11, 1994 by Mr. DeLand, and was likewise fully 
briefed and argued by Assistant Attorneys General, Michael D. Wimms 
and Creighton Horton for the prosecution. (R.89-90) 
As a consequence of Mr. DeLandTs Motion to Dismiss, the 
District Court dismissed the felony charges. The dismissal was 
granted upon the sole motion of the defense, over the objection and 
without the stipulation, approval, agreement or acquiescence of the 
prosecution. (R. 89-90; Docket, Criminal no. 931800490, Minute 
Entry of April 11, 1994, R. 79-85 at 81) 
Subsequent to dismissal of the felony charges against Sheriff 
Meacham, a plea bargain was struck whereby Mr. Meacham agreed, 
inter alia, to plead guilty to the three charged class B 
misdemeanors. The State agreed not to file an amended information 
seeking additional charges against Mr. Meacham. (R. 89; Affidavit 
of Defendant Lloyd Meacham in Advance of Guilty Plea and Agreement, 
Criminal no. 931800490, R. 68-74) 
As Sheriff Meacham's counsel Mr. DeLand determined from the 
outset of his representation that the three misdemeanor charges 
were essentially well-founded and indefensible. The matters of 
overriding importance were the felony charges. Therefore Mr. 
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DeLand concentrated virtually all of his efforts toward defense of 
the felony charges. Mr. DeLand attributes only a few hours of his 
over-all representation to defense of the misdemeanor charges. (R. 
87) 
Mr. DeLand billed Sheriff Meacham in accordance with their 
prior fee agreement. (R. 87,88) The total amount of the claim is 
approximately $36,000, exclusive of any amount which might be 
attributable to defense of the misdemeanor matters. (R. 87-88) The 
District Court by its adverse rulings on the issue of the County's 
liability, (R. 198-200; 252-253), however, precluded inquiry into 
whether the attorney's fees incurred by Mr. Meacham in defense of 
the felony charges were fair, reasonable and necessarily incurred. 
Those issues are therefore not before this Court. 
In or about May of 1994 subsequent to conclusion of the 
criminal case, Sheriff Meacham assigned to Mr. DeLand all right, 
title and interest to recover all attorney's fees, costs and 
expenses which he incurred and might be entitled to recover against 
Uintah County. The original written assignment was lost, misplaced 
or destroyed, however it was replaced. (R. 89; Assignment of 
Claims, R. 63) 
Pursuant to that assignment Mr. DeLand submitted Sheriff 
Meacham's claim to Uintah County on or about July 7, 1994 
requesting reimbursement of the attorney's fees and costs in regard 
to defense of the criminal case. (R. 88; 59-61) Mr. DeLand 
subsequently held numerous discussions with representatives of 
Uintah County, however no compensation was ever agreed to or paid. 
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(R. 88) 
Accordingly on March 6, 1996, Mr. DeLand brought an action 
against Uintah County. (R. 1-8) His claim, based upon assignment 
of Mr. Meacham's claim for reimbursement of attorney's fees 
pursuant to statute, is specifically set forth in the Second Cause 
of Action of his Amended Complaint. (R. 19-24) 
Mr. DeLand submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment as to the 
Issues of Liability and Damages as to Plaintiff's Second Cause of 
action on or about June 21, 1996. (R. 44-133). Uintah County 
responded on or about July 29, 1996 with a counter-motion entitled 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability. (R. 137-
197). 
The trial court entered its memorandum "Ruling" denying 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgement on the Issue of Liability 
and Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue 
of Liability, both in respect to the second cause of action of 
Appellant's First Amended Complaint on August 7, 1996. (R. 198-
200; Addendum, Exhibit A) 
The District Court's decision adopted Uintah County's position 
that all six counts of the Information must have been dismissed or 
result in an acquittal for Sheriff Meacham to entitled him to any 
reimbursement of his defense costs. The District Court reasoned 
that inasmuch as, ". . . there was not a complete exoneration of 
Sheriff Meacham in this case, this Court can not allow attorney 
fees for defense which did not result in a total but only a partial 
acquittal." (R. 199) 
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Mr. DeLand timely filed a Motion for "New Trial" Pursuant to 
Rule 59(a)(7) U.R.C.P. on or about August 15, 1996, (R. 235-244), 
to which the County responded (R. 247-251) or about September 
13, 1996. The Trial Court issued its memorandum "Ruling" denying 
Appellant's motion for new trial on or about September 17, 1996 
reaffirming its August 7th "Ruling11. (R. 252-253; Addendum, 
Exhibit B) 
The parties stipulated to dismissal of the Appellant's 
remaining claims for relief (R. 254-255) and pursuant thereto the 
Trial Court's Order of Dismissal of Plaintiff's First and Third 
Causes of Action Without Prejudice was made and entered on or about 
October 11, 1996, thus disposing of all remaining claims and 
issues. (R. 256-257; addendum, Exhibit C) Thereafter, from the 
trial court's "Ruling" of September 17, 1996 the Appellant filed 
his Notice of Appeal on or about October 11, 1996. (R. 258-259). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is a case of statutory construction. Appellant's 
argument is that a claimant under § 63~30a-2, U.C.A., as amended, 
is entitled to recoup his attorney's fees for those Counts of a 
multi-count Information which were dismissed upon his motion or 
upon which he has otherwise prevailed upon the merits, irrespective 
of the fact that on other counts he may have been found or entered 
a plea of guilty. The statute does not require "complete 
exoneration" and it is a misconstruction of the statute to require 
that the "whole" information be dismissed before any recovery of 
attorney's fees may be had. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court's Ruling that in a multi-count 
information, the entire information must be dismissed in 
order to qualify a defendant for reimbursement of his 
attorney's fees under § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., is in error. 
The statute in question refers such terms as "indictment" and 
"information", to the terms "act" or "omission", in the singular: 
If a state grand jury indicts or if an information is 
filed against an officer or employee, in connection with 
or arising out of any act or omission of that officer or 
employee during the performance of his duties, within the 
scope of his employment or under color of his authority, 
and that indictment or information is quashed or 
dismissed or results in a judgment of acquittal, unless 
the indictment or information is quashed or dismissed 
upon application or motion of the prosecuting attorney, 
that officer or employee shall be entitled to recover 
from the public entity reasonable attorneys1 fees and 
court costs necessarily incurred in the defense of that 
indictment or information. (emphasis added) 
Section 63-30a-2, U.C.A., as amended. 
The plain language of the statute indicates that "an 
information" is used in reference to a singular event, "any act or 
omission". The statute does not address multi-count informations. 
Appellant's position is that a public employee should be entitled 
to recover for the defense costs of individual counts dismissed 
from a multi-count information. Such a reading is consistent both 
internally within itself and with various other provisions of the 
Utah Code and Rules of Criminal Procedure which speak to the 
meaning of the term "information". 
The District Court held that because there was not "a complete 
exoneration of Sheriff Meacham in this case, this Court can not 
allow attorney fees for defense which did not result in a total but 
only a partial acquittal." (R. 199) The District Court's 
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reasoning is set forth as follows: 
This Court is of the opinion that the statute should be 
construed narrowly and that its legislative purpose and 
intent would be to fully compensate a person who held 
public office from having to defend criminal charges 
brought as a result of his holding that office where the 
charges were found to be unfounded and either dismissed 
or where the defendant obtained a full acquittal. (R. 
199) 
The District Court's finding of such legislative purpose and 
intent requiring "full acquittal" is not apparent from reading the 
plain language of the statute. A more practical yet nonetheless 
literal reading dictates a contrary conclusion. 
In interpreting a legislative enactment it is fundamental that 
the court looks first to the plain language of the statute. If 
there is no reason to go beyond the plain language, rescrt to 
extrinsic factors is unnecessary: 
(0)ur primary objective is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent. Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 
562-63 (Utah 1996) (citing West Jordan v, Morrison, 656 
P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982)). We generally look first to 
the plain language of the statute to discern the 
legislative intent. Id. " 'Thus, we will interpret a 
statute according to its plain language, unless such a 
reading is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in 
blatant contravention of the express purpose of the 
statute.' " Id. (quoting Perrine v. Kennecott Mining 
Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996). "'Only when we 
find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we 
seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant 
policy considerations.' " Id. (quoting World Peace 
Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 
259 (Utah 1994)). 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 
1186 (Utah 1996). 
"A statute is ambiguous if it can be understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons to have different meanings." Patterson v. 
Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah App. 1995). 
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Appellant is not urging this court to find that the statute is 
ambiguous. The plain language and a common sense reading dictate 
an interpretation that, since different charges can and perhaps 
sometimes must be brought in one information (e.g. Rule 9.5 
U.R.Cr.P.), and the statute speaks in terms of "an information" for 
an "act" or "omission", in effect a multi-count information 
contains more than one information, each count a separate 
information. However, even if is deemed to be ambiguous, extrinsic 
evidence such as other statutes and rules, common usage, policy 
considerations, and the limited evidence of legislative intent 
establish that the District Court's narrow interpretation is not 
warranted. 
Assuming arguendo that an ambiguity exists, the limited amount 
of legislative history which was before the District Court (R. 154-
156; R. 94-101), the discussion on the floor of the Senate, seems 
to lend at least as much if not greater credence to the Appellant's 
position. The following is excerpted of Senator Haven Barlow's 
statement on the Senate Floor, March 7, 1977: 
Mr. president, Senate Bill 247 relates to the providing 
for the reimbursement to officers and employees for legal 
fees and costs incurred in the special defense of a grand 
jury indictment. Of course, what this means is if they 
are found innocent and in defending themselves against 
charges which were not proven, it would simply reimburse 
them for reasonable attorney fees, for these charges, or 
for the indictment. . . . (emphasis added) 
Transcript of debate, March 7, 1977, Senate Bill 247. 
The broader view is supported by the language of other rules 
and statutes. For example, Rule 4 U.R.Cr.P. states in subsection 
(b) that "an indictment or information shall charge the offense for 
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which the defendant is being prosecuted . . . " (emphasis added), 
and states in subsection (d) that ". . . after verdict, an 
indictment or information may be amended so as to state the offense 
with such particularity as to bar subsequent prosecution . . ." 
(emphasis added), and further states in subsection (e) "when facts 
not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform 
a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged. . . . " 
(emphasis added). 
The underlying implication of these portions of Rule 4 is that 
"an information" states a single free-standing offense, "an 
offense". There is no need to further define what effect an 
information with multiple counts may have on Rule 4. The reason 
for this is obvious, i.e., each count is treated as a separate 
information for all intents and purposes within the Rule. 
An information is specifically defined as follows: 
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing 
charging a person with a public offense which is 
presented, signed and filed in the office of the clerk 
where the prosecution is commenced pursuant to § 77-2-
1.1. (emphasis added) Section 77-1-3, U.C.A., as 
amended. 
The very essence of this definition is that an information charges 
a separate, independent and single public offense. 
By logical extension an information charging more than one 
public offense is in effect more than one Information. So in a 
literal sense what Sheriff Meacham obtained through the efforts of 
his legal counsel in the criminal case was the dismissal of three 
felony informations. Joining more than one separate offense in a 
single information does not alter the separate and distinct nature 
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and quality of each separate offense so charged. There is no 
melding together of separate crimes just because they are charged 
jointly in one document. There is no synergistic effect among 
separate charges set forth as multiple offenses in a single 
physical document, which such document has come by common usage to 
be termed an "information." 
On the contrary, each count or charge of an indictment or 
information is to be considered separately; the State must prove 
each element of each charged crime by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Each separate alleged offense must stand and be considered 
on its own. In jury trials involving multi-count informations, 
there is a stock jury instruction which is uniformly given to that 
effect. This Court has approved such an instruction: 
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of 
the Information. Each charge and the evidence pertaining 
to it should be considered separately. The fact that you 
may find the accused guilty or not guilty as to one of 
the offenses charged should not control your verdict as 
to any other offense charged. 
Footnote 5, State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 46 (Utah App. 
1990) 
There is no reason to treat separately charged offenses any 
differently for the purpose of reimbursement pursuant to § 63-30a-
2. 
Uintah County argued in the District Court that if a public 
employee were charged with 20 criminal counts, 19 resulting in 
convictions, while one resulted in an acquittal, it would not be 
proper to afford the public employee reimbursement for his 
attorneyTs fees for the count which was dismissed. This conclusion 
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merely begs the question. If the particular count dismissed were 
one wherein the cost of defense could be segregated and determined 
with reasonable accuracy there is simply no logical reason why such 
fees should not be reimbursed. 
The offense which was dismissed might be the only felony in a 
20 count indictment involving unrelated misdemeanors. For example, 
a defendant might be charged with alteration of a proposed 
legislative bill or resolution, a third degree felony pursuant to 
§ 76-8-107, and 19 separate class B misdemeanor counts of receiving 
bribes pursuant to § 76-8-106. Or the Felony Count might be one 
arising from an act or omission in the course of employment for 
which defense costs would be reimbursable pursuant to § 63-30a-2, 
but the misdemeanor counts wholly unrelated to the course and scope 
of public employment. In either case, while the misdemeanor counts 
may be readily proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the felony matter 
might be one of which the public employee is innocent, the charge 
defensible cind by virtue of defense counsel's efforts a dismissal 
or acquittal results. In such a scenario the overwhelming bulk of 
the defense effort might be put to the defense of but one out of 
twenty counts. There is simply no logical reason why § 63-30a-2, 
U.C.A., would not afford a remedy for reimbursement of attorney's 
fees for that portion of the defense which was allocated to the 
felony. Of course, the situation could be reversed and the matter 
which was dismissed might not be worthy of but a small amount of 
reimbursement. 
The District Court's avowed "narrow" construction overlooks 
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the fact that there is no qualitative distinction between the 
acquittal or dismissal of one count encompassing "an act or 
omission" among many alleged offenses in a multi-count information, 
and that of a one count information. There are many possible 
permutations which illustrate the kind of confusion the District 
Court's ruling engenders. Picture for example two situations, in 
each of which a public employee is charged with three felonies, 
each of which would be reimbursable under § 63-30a-2, and three 
misdemeanors, none of which would. In the first case suppose the 
defendant is acquitted of all six counts. Given the District 
Court's "narrow" construction the public employee defendant would 
be entitled to recover all defense costs. In the second instance 
the defendant is acquitted of the felonies but convicted of the 
misdemeanors. By the District Court's reasoning the public 
employee could not recover defense costs even though the 
misdemeanor convictions had no relationship whatsoever to the 
defendantf s public employment. 
Such a perverse result could not have been intended by the 
legislature in enacting § 63-30a-2, U.C.A. The District Court's 
narrow construction renders the statute "unreasonably confused, 
inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of 
the statute." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, supra, 920 
P.2d 1183, 1186. 
The problem is in reality not a matter of statutory 
construction. There is a semantic difference between the 
definition of information as "an accusation ... (of) a public 
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offense . . . " § 77-1-3, U.C.A., supra, and the physical document 
which is universally referred to as an "information" regardless of 
the number of counts which may be joined. The former is precise 
definition; the latter custom and usage. Section 63-30a-2 itself 
however does nothing to prevent the courts from recognizing that 
distinction for what it is, were semantics, and allocating the 
appropriate amount of attorney's fees to compensate the public 
employee who has been vindicated on one or more counts. The 
problem is only a practical one of determining and segregating the 
attorney's fees for the count(s) dismissed. There is no need to 
throw out the entire statutory right of reimbursement because of 
some perceived difficulty in proof. 
Even in civil practice, where multiple causes of action are 
the norm, the rules discuss the charging document as "a pleading 
which sets forth a claim for relief" (emphasis added) and state 
that such pleading shall contain "a short and plain statement of 
the claim . . ." (emphasis added). Rule 8(a) U.R.C.P. So likewise, 
each civil cause of action might be considered a separate 
"complaint". In federal civil rights matters for instance it is 
common practice for court's to segregate out attorney's fees with 
respect to matters upon which a plaintiff has prevailed from those 
the plaintiff has lost, and award a reasonable attorney's fee for 
success on those winning issues in litigation notwithstanding the 
failure of other claims made. See, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 
424 (1983); Tidewell v. Ft. Howard Corp,, 898 F.2d 406, 412 (10th 
Cir. 1993). The key in such cases is to achieve success on the 
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merits of a significant issue in the litigation. Once the 
plaintiff has done this, he "has crossed the threshold to a fee 
award of some kind." Texas State Teacher's Assoc, v. Garland 
Independent School Dist., 498 U.S. 782, 791-92 (1989). 
By analogy to this case it is clear that Sheriff Meacham 
crossed the threshold to a fee award by having three significant 
successes on the merits of three significant issues, specifically 
three felony charges ("Informations", as it were) which were 
dismissed. He is not entitled to and no compensation is requested 
for defense of the misdemeanors. The substantial cost of defense 
of the felonies, however, should be compensated. It is an 
unnecessary, inequitable and unjust reading of the statute not to 
do so. 
The District Court states in its Ruling (R. 199), that "when 
Judge Hyde dismissed the felony charges, it was a result of his 
interpretation of the exact felony that was charged," apparently 
attaching some special significance to the particulars of the 
reasoning by which Judge Hyde arrived at his decision to dismiss 
the felony charges against sheriff Meacham. Under the type of 
circumstances presented here, where the court in the criminal case 
entertains a motion to dismiss based upon an undisputed set of 
facts, the determination to dismiss is always as a consequence of 
the judge's "interpretation" of the exact felony that was charged. 
As a result of Judge Hyde's interpretation and application of the 
specific facts of the case to the law, he determined that those 
facts did not constitute the public offense charged. 
19 
As to those felony counts which Judge Hyde dismissed, the 
dismissals amounted to complete exoneration and vindication of the 
accused. There can be no other conclusion drawn. 
The District Court's assertion that the legislative intent was 
to fully compensate a person who held public office where charges 
were found to be unfounded (R. 199) is correct. Judge Hyde found 
just that: the felony charges against Sheriff Meacham were 
unfounded; they were therefore dismissed. Judge Hyde?s ruling 
meant that reasonable jurors could not differ in their belief that 
Sheriff Meacham was not guilty of the felony offenses charged. It 
was a dismissal on motion of the defense which fully satisfied the 
reimbursement statute. Sheriff Meacham could not have been any 
more vindicated or exonerated than he was by these dismissals. 
The District Court's Ruling (R. 198-200) fosters an ad hoc 
determination in every case a charge is dismissed in a multi-count 
information as to whether the facts were "close" to the charges 
dismissed. In assessing the issue of reimbursement of attorney's 
fees, this would require the court to decide whether the "facts" 
which gave rise to the dismissed criminal charges were bad or good 
ones. If the facts are "bad", then the perpetrator shouldn't get 
attorney's fees, even though the case was dismissed on the merits. 
This procedure is not provided by § 63-30A-2. Once the charges 
have been dismissed the reason for the dismissal has no bearing on 
the right to reimbursement of fees. 
If the question is perceived to revolve around whether the 
facts are "close" to the dismissed charges, the merger doctrine 
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notwithstanding, Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Ut.2d 397, 402 P. 2d 696, 697 
(1965); Adams v. Davies, 107 Ut. 597, 156 P.2d 207, 209 (1945), 
then reimbursement would occur under only the most egregious 
circumstances, e.g., where criminal charges are filed with reckless 
disregard as to the merit or truthfulness of the allegations. In 
most criminal prosecutions, at least where identity is not at 
issue, the "facts" will often be "close" to the allegations. But 
"close" is, of course, anathema to finding a person guilty by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It is furthermore not unknown for the "wrong" charges to be 
brought under circumstances where a defendant, while not guilty of 
the offense charged, might well be found guilty of something if 
more appropriate charges were brought given the same facts. That 
does not mean that a vigorous defense was not reasonable and 
necessary in a case where the "wrong" charges are filed, nor that 
the defendant is not vindicated and exonerated of those charges 
when dismissed. 
in holding that in order to obtain reimbursement a multi-count 
Information must always be dismissed in its entirety, the District 
Court's decision encourages the prosecution to lump a charge such 
as reckless driving, regardless of its substance or weight, along 
with a serious charge such as first degree murder by a peace 
officer in the chance hope of getting a conviction, perhaps a 
compromise verdict, at least on the less serious but more easily 
proven offense in order to defeat the officer's right to attorney 
fees if he is acquitted of the homicide. 
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This is neither sound statutory construction, nor sensible 
policy. Each count or cause of action must be considered on its 
own. Each count must be considered a separate independent free-
standing "information". The notion uhat in order to be entitled to 
reimbursement, the employee must obtain a dismissal of all the 
counts, related or unrelated, elevates form over substance to an 
absurd degree, makes no logical sense, and ^n fact flies in the 
face of the definitions and usages provided by existing statutes 
and rules. 
If the public employee prevails on some counts but not others, 
the problem is a practical one, not a legal one. The same sort of 
weighing and sifting must take place as prescribed in Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P. 2d 985 (Utah 1988). There although the 
bank's claim against Bracken was small, the court determined it was 
entitled to a comparatively large fee based on a number of factors, 
among them, the difficulty presented by the counterclaim imposed, 
the tactics used by the defendants, etc. Id. at 991. On its face 
it would not seem fair to award the bank a fee greater than its 
basic claim. But, despite the ostensibly perverse result and the 
difficulties of proof with regard to allocating what portion of 
attorney's fees should be attributed to contract and which to tort, 
etc., the Supreme Court held that the circumstances warranted such 
a conclusion. By the same token, the fact that Sheriff Meacham 
entered a subsequent plea to misdemeanors which were jointly 
charged with the dismissed felonies is no reason to deny him 
reimbursement with respect to those separate charges against which 
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he was required to devote substantial resources to defend and upon 
which he was completely exonerated. 
The District Court's reference to the public employee 
negotiating for attorney's fees at the time of the "plea bargain" 
is also unsound. (R. 198) In addition to being inconsistent with 
§ 63-30a-2, U.C.A., which provides for complete reimbursement upon 
dismissal, it fails to consider the realities of the reimbursement 
statute whereby the employee is directed to seek payment not from 
the prosecuting authority, in this case the state attorney general, 
but from " . . . funds appropriated by the department or division 
that employed the officer or employee. ." § 63-30a-3(2)(a), 
U.C.A. The mention of attorney's fees during plea bargaining, 
particularly under the instant circumstances where the prosecutor 
has absolutely no province or authority, is clearly untenable and 
inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's granting of Appellee's motion for Summary 
Judgment on the issue of Liability should be reversed and this case 
remanded with directions that the Appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the issue of Liability be granted and for the District 
Court to hold such proceedings as may be necessary to determine the 
amount of reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs necessarily 
incurred in the defense of the dismissed felony charges against 
Sheriff Meacham and to award such amount to Appellant as so 
determined along with Appellant's reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs in bringing this appeal. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thi »j£ day of January, 1997. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^ -~"^&ay of January, 1997, I 
caused to be served two (2) true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant by mailing same, postage prepaid, to: 
JoAnn B. Stringham 
Uintah County Attorney 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
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ADDENDUM 1 
63-30a-l STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
63-30a-1. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Officer or employee" means any individual who at the time of an 
event giving rise to a claim under this act is or was elected or appointed to 
or employed by a public entity, whether or not compensated, but does not 
include an independent contractor. 
(2) "Public entity" means the state or any political subdivision of it or 
any office, department, division, board, agency, commission, council, au-
thority, institution, hospital, school, college, university, or other instru-
mentality of the state or any such political subdivision. 
History: L. 1977, ch. 245, § 1. act," as used in this section, means Laws 1977, 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this ch. 245, which enacted this chapter. 
63-30a-2. Indictment or information against officer or em-
ployee — Reimbursement of attorneys' fees and 
court costs incurred in defense. 
If a state grand jury indicts or if an information is filed against an officer or 
employee, in connection with or arising out of any act or omission of that 
officer or employee during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
his employment or under color of his authority, and that indictment or infor-
mation is quashed or dismissed or results in a judgment of acquittal, unless 
the indictment or information is quashed or dismissed upon application or 
motion of the prosecuting attorney, that officer or employee shall be entitled 
to recover from the public entity reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs 
necessarily incurred in the defense of that indictment or information. 
History: L. 1977, ch. 245, § 2; 1983, ch. 
131, 8 7. 
1MMUP 
PERFORMIN 
Section 
63-30b-l. 
63-30b-2. 
Definitions. 
Voluntary services 
from liability — 
63-30b-l. Definitio 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Public entity" 
any office, departmei 
thority, institution, \ 
mentality of the sta 
(2) "Compensation 
ever, whether per di< 
for the purpose of p; 
by the person perfo 
History: C. 1953, G3-30b-l, 
1979, ch. 93, § 1. 
Meaning of "this act." — 
63-30a-3. Payment of reimbursement of attorneys' fees 
and court costs. 
(1) A request for reimbursement of attorneys' fees and court costs shall be 
filed in the manner provided in Sections 63-30-36 and 63-30-37. 
(2) (a) Any reimbursement of attorneys' fees and court costs filed on behalf 
of an officer or employee of the state shall be paid from funds appropri-
ated to the department or division that employed the officer or employee 
at the time of the act or omission that gave rise to the indictment or 
information. 
(b) If those funds are unavailable, the reimbursement shall be paid 
from the General Fund upon approval by the Board of Examiners and 
legislative appropriation. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30a-3, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 131, § 8; 1986, ch. 194, § 16; 1987, 
ch. 30, § 3. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1983, 
ch. 131, § 8 repealed former § 63-30a-3, as en-
acted by Laws 1977, ch. 245, § 3, relating to 
application of the 1977 act, and enacted 
present § 63-30a-3. 
Severability Clauses. — Section 9 of Laws 
1983, ch. 131 provided: "If any provision of this 
A.L.R. — Construction an 
"Good Samaritan" statutes. 6«v 
63-30b-2. Volunta 
Exceptio 
Any person performii 
tion, under the general s 
be immune from liabilit 
in connection with the o 
those services, unless i 
grossly negligent, not i 
History: C. 1953, 63-30b-'2 
1979, ch. 93, § 2. 
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ADDENDUM 2 
fINAL CODE 
r or 
the rights of any innocent persons. Ant 
ercisable by or transferable for value to the] 
H to the defendant. The defendant or anyj 
* on behalf of the defendant is not eligible 
t any sale ordered by the court, 
stay the sale or disposition of the property 
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nstrates that proceeding with the sale or^  
^esult in irreparable injury, harm, or loss'; 
>r other disposition of property forfeited 
s forfeited may be used first to pay the 
the sale including expenses of seizure, 
property pending its disposition, adver-
ted under Subsections (7) through (13) 
a (6). 
sions of this section to the contrary, the 
en records applicable to the forfeitable 
ny valid lien against the property has 
holder did not violate the provisions of 
»nerty shall be subject to such lien, and 
m of the property to the lien holde 
secured by the lien, 
ider Subsection 
nay: 
nation or remission of forfeiture, for 
victims of a violation of this section or 
0he rights of innocent persons in the 
ty, in its discretion, grant the petition; 
ider this section; 
is providing information resulting in a 
tecessary to safeguard and maintain 
s section pending its disposition, 
•vhere forfeiture is declared, in whole 
>y the prosecuting agency prosecuting 
the recipient of forfeited assets from 
re proceeding including seizure and 
ifi individual or individuals whose 
re, and may assess costs against any 
operty as appropriate, 
i independent of any other proceed-
section or the laws of this state. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
t, effective July 1, 1996, rewrote Subsection (a). 
is (7) through (13), the 
TITLE 77 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
Jhapter 
j£ Preliminary Provisions, 
pa. Peace Officer Designation. 
2a. Pleas in Abeyance. 
Security to Keep the Peace. 
Removal by Judicial Proceedings. 
Arrest, by Whom, and How Made. 
Commitment and Treatment of Mentally 111 Persons. 
The Judgment. 
The Appeal. 
The Execution. 
Bail. 
Bail Forfeiture Procedure. 
Subpoena Powers for Aid of Criminal Investigation and Grants of 
Immunity. 
Interception of Communications. 
Disposal of Property Received by Peace Officer. 
Pardons and Paroles. 
Extradition. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. 
Counsel for Indigent Defendants. 
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 
Victims' Rights. 
Rights of Crime Victims Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
% 
6. 
7. 
i6a. 
18. 
18a. 
19. 
20. 
20a. 
:22. 
23a. 
24. 
27. 
30. 
31. 
31a. 
32. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
Section 
77-1-3. Definitions. 
77-1-3. Definitions. 
For the purpose of this act: 
(1) "Criminal action" means the proceedings by which a person is 
charged, accused, and brought to trial for a public offense. 
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation in writing presented by a grand 
jury to the district court charging a person with a public offense. 
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, charging a person 
with a public offense which is presented, signed, and filed in the office of 
the clerk where the prosecution is commenced pursuant to Section 
77-2-1.1. 
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(4) "Magistrate" means a justice or judge of a court of record or not of 
record or a commissioner of such a court appointed in accordance with 
Section 78-3-31, except that the authority of a court commissioner to act as 
a magistrate shall be limited by rule of the judicial council. The judicial 
council rules shall not exceed constitutional limitations upon the delega-
tion of judicial authority. 
History: C. 1953, 77-1-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 68, § 1; 1983, ch. 
212, § 1; 1985, ch. 174, § 2; 1985, ch. 212, 
§ 16; 1990, ch. 59, § 26; 1991, ch. 268, § 16; 
1992, ch. 33, § 1; 1995, ch. 201, § 2. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added the proviso 
at the end of the first sentence and added the 
second sentence in Subsection (4). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Double jeopardy. 
— Sentencing. 
Modification of defendant's sentence between 
the oral announcement of sentence and the 
later entry of a more severe written sentence 
did not violate constitutional and statutory 
protections against double jeopardy. Under 
State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), a sentence is not entered until it has 
been reduced to writing and signed by the court 
and thus defendant was sentenced only once. 
State v. Wright, 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). 
CHAPTER la 
PEACE OFFICER DESIGNATION 
Section 
77-la-2. 
77-la-4. 
Correctional officer. 
Special function officers. 
Section 
77-la-10. Duties to investigate specified in-
stances of abuse or neglect. 
77-la-l. Peace officer. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Application of "fireman's rule" to inflicted by defendant in resisting arrest, 25 
preclude recovery by peace officer for injuries A.L.R.5th 97. 
77-la-2. Correctional officer. 
(1) (a) "Correctional officer" means an officer or employee of the Depart* 
ment of Corrections, youth corrections, any political subdivision of the 
state, or any private entity which contracts with the state or its political 
subdivisions to incarcerate inmates, who is charged with the primary duty' 
of providing community protection. 
(b) "Correctional officer" includes an individual assigned to carry out] 
any of the following types of functions: 
(i) controlling, transporting, supervising, and taking into custody of 
persons arrested or convicted of crimes; 
(ii) supervising and preventing the escape of persons in state anil 
local incarceration facilities; and 
(iii) guarding and managing inmates and providing security an 
enforcement services at a correctional facility. 
(2) (a) Correctional officers hi 
in the performance of their 
employed by the Departmc 
Chapter lo , Department of' 
(b) Correctional officers n 
under conditions specified by 
or the chief law enforcement 
(3) (a) An individual may not 
until the individual has satis 
for correctional officers and t 
or the chief administrator 
completion of training to tl 
Training. 
(b) The Department of Cor 
shall establish and maintai 
service training programs a 
Standards and Training, wit 
Peace Officer Standards and r 
of no fewer than 40 hours per 
own staff or other agencies. 
(4) Employees of the Division < 
contract with the division are not 
section until July 1, 1997. 
History: C. 1953, 77-la-2, enacted I 
1985, ch. 174, § 3; 1993, ch. 103, § 7; 
ch. 163, § 1. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1996 an 
77-la-4. Special functioi 
(1) (a) "Special function office 
investigations, service of lega 
(b) "Special function officei 
port-of-entry agents as define 
or agents of the Department o 
enforce the provisions of Title 
school district security offic« 
designated pursuant to Secti 
Center security officers desig 
fire arson investigators for aj 
security officers of any airport 
political subdivisions, railroad 
under Section 17-30-2, and ; 
having peace officer authority 
(c) Ordinance enforcement 
ties may be special function o 
(2) (a) Special function officer.1 
engaged in the duties of thei 
general law enforcement. If tl 
respecting facilities or prope 
connection with acts occurri 
employed or when required ft 
property, or employees. 
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Rule 2. Time. 
(a) In computing any period of time, the day of the act or event from which 
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day 
of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, 
or a legal holiday. When a period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 
seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall not be 
included in the computation. 
(b) When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified 
time, the court for cause shown may, at any time in its discretion: 
(1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if re-
quest therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally pre-
scribed or as extended by a previous order; or 
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period, per-
mit the act to be done if there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to 
act; but the court may not extend the time for taking any action under the 
rules applying to a judgment of acquittal, new trial, arrest of judgment 
and appeal, unless otherwise provided in these rules. 
(c) A written motion other than one that may be heard ex parte and notice 
of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than five days before the time 
specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by rule or order of 
the court. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be 
served with the motion and opposing affidavits may be served not less than 
one day before the hearing unless the court permits them to be served at a 
later time. 
Rule 3. Service and filing of papers. 
(a) All written motions, notices and pleadings shall be filed with the court 
and served on all other parties. 
(b) Whenever service is required or permitted to be made upon a party 
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney, 
unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the 
attorney or upon a party shall be made in the manner provided in civil ac-
tions. 
(c) The party preparing an order shall, upon execution by the court, mail to 
each party a copy thereof and certify to the court such mailing. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Service on attorney. 
Notice served upon a party's attorney of 
record is sufficient. State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 
987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses. 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indict-
ment or information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense 
has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the 
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by 
common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the 
offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. An information 
may contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to make out 
probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things 
as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be al-
leged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, 
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by 
any name or description by which they are generally known or by which they 
may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning 
such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presump-
tions of law nor matters of judicial notice need be stated. 
(c) The court may i 
ment or information 
(d) The court may 
any time before verdi 
substantial rights oft 
ment or information 
particularity as to bai 
same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not 
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(f) An indictment c 
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(h) Words and phra 
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meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjun 
the indictment or infc 
(j) The names of wit: 
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(k) If the defendant 
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be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indict-
riht or information. 
id) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at 
py time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the 
febstantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indict-
ment or information may be amended so as to state the offense with such 
Kkicularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the 
ame set of facts. 
t(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to 
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to 
Enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for 
a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten 
J^ays thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may, 
on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars 
may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as 
justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall 
be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the essen-
tial elements of the particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any 
name contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso 
contained in the statute creating or defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual 
meaning unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal 
meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate 
the indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information 
was based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall 
not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on appli-
cation of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except 
upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he pro-
poses to call whose names are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to 
appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. 
Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural 
person. 
Cross-References. — Accused entitled to 
copy of accusation, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12. 
Circuit courts, criminal jurisdiction, 
§ 78-4-5. 
Criminal Code definition of "corporation," 
§ 76-2-201. 
Criminal Code not strictly construed, 
§ 76-1-106. 
Criminal 
§ 76-2-204. 
Criminal responsibility of person for conduct 
in name of corporation, § 76-2-205. 
Double jeopardy, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12; 
§§ 76-1-401 to 76-1-405, 77-1-6. 
General definitions for Criminal Code, 
§ 76-1-601. 
"Indictment" defined, § 77-1-3. 
responsibility of corporation, 
"Information" defined, § 77-1-3. 
Jurisdiction of military court, § 39-6-16. 
Judicial notice, Rules of Evidence, Rule 201. 
Justice courts, criminal jurisdiction, 
§ 78-5-104 et seq. 
Juveniles, jurisdiction, transfer, §§ 78-3a-16 
to 78-3a-19. * 
Nonmaterial errors and mistakes, Rule 30. 
Preliminary examination, Rule 7. 
Proof of corporate existence, § 77-17-5. 
Prosecution by indictment or information af-
ter examination and commitment or waiver 
thereof, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 13. 
Removal of officers, Utah Const., Art. VI, 
Sec. 21; § 77-6-1 et seq. 
Statutory construction and definitions in 
general, §§ 68-3-11, 68-3-12. 
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—In general. 
—Contents. 
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EXHIBIT A 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LONI F. DELAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UINTAH COUNTY, 
Defendant. 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
issue of liability and damages and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
issue of liability. The Court heard oral argument July 30, 1996 and took the matter under 
advisement. The Court has carefully read the Memoranda in support of both Motions with 
the accompanying exhibits. 
The essential facts necessary to decide this case are not in dispute. Those facts are 
set forth in separate paragraph numbers in Plaintiff's Memorandum and will not be 
reincorporated in this Ruling. It should be noted that the parties have essentially agreed as to 
those facts except for the reasonableness or the amount of the fees and the fact the 
representatives of Uintah County had previously acknowledged that compensation would be 
appropriate. 
Reference is made to Plaintiffs Memorandum and the statements of facts contained 
therein. 
The Court is faced with the construction of Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30a-2. 
That statute provides in relevant part: 
" If an Information is filed against an officer or employee, in 
connection with or arising out of any act or omission of that officer 
or employee during the performance of his duties, within the scope 
of his employment or under color of his authority, and that 
Information is quashed or dismissed or results in a Judgment of 
Acquittal, (unless dismissed by the prosecutor), that officer 
or employee shall be entitled to recover from the public entity reasonable 
attorney fees and court costs necessarily incurred in the defense of that 
Information." 
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The Defendant urges a strict construction of the statute and argues that reimbursement 
should not be allowed because the Information was not dismissed nor did it result in acquittal. 
The Plaintiff argues that to construe the statute narrowly would result in a complete 
nullity of the intent of the Legislature and would make the statute meaningless. 
It should further be noted that the interpretation of the statute is of first impression. It 
should be noted in Salmon vs. Davis County. 289 Utah Advanced Reports 3 (Utah 1996), that 
the issue of liability under the statute was not before the Court. 
This Court is of the opinion that the Legislative intent here is to partially encourage 
qualified persons to run for political office without having to have them be exposed to 
tremendous legal fees to defend ill founded actions including criminal actions. The statutory 
scheme provides for prior notice for the defense of civil claims and the statute in question here 
provides for reimbursement of legal fees in criminal prosecutions. 
It would seem to this Court that prior notice would not be necessary under the statutory 
format and scheme of things where a defense attorney was retained privately to defend a 
criminal matter. The Court is further of the opinion that the intended legislative purpose here 
was to provide for defense costs for persons holding public office that are charged with crimes 
as a result of being in that office which are either dismissed as a matter of law or where there 
is a complete judgment of acquittal. 
In the present case, much is said about the three felony charges being dismissed by the 
Court, but there only remained the three misdemeanor charges. It would seem to this Court that 
when Judge Hyde dismissed the felony charges, it was a result of his interpretation of the exact 
felony that was charged as it involved the activities of Sheriff Meacham. In this case, Sheriff 
Meacham did some things which were not completely dismissed and the case was not tried to 
a verdict. 
This Court is of the opinion that the statute should be construed narrowly and that its 
legislative purpose and intent would be to fully compensate a person who held public office from 
having to defend criminal charges brought as a result of his holding that office where the charges 
were found to be unfounded and either dismissed or where the defendant obtained a full 
acquittal. 
Because there was not a complete exoneration of Sheriff Meacham in this case, this Court 
can not allow attorney fees for defense which did not result in a total but only a partial acquittal. 
The Court's interpretation of Section 63-30a-2 is consistent with Salmon vs. Davis 
County. In Salmon, a Deputy Sheriff was found not guilty by two separate juries and separate 
trials on charges of assault that arose out of actions by Salmon. Justice Zimmerman's comment 
in the case is worthy of note: 
-2-
". . . . The purpose of Section 63-30a-2, which is to indemnify a vindicated 
employee. (Regarding the right to defense fees)." 
This Court acknowledges that to interpret the statute thus narrowly will discourage 
plea agreements involving public officials, but at least part of the factor in the plea 
arrangement, if any is made, will be whether or not defense fees will be reimbursed. 
For the above and foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss on the issue of liability. The Court will not address the other issues remaining in 
the case are they were and are rendered moot by the decision herein. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of August, 1996. 
BY THE COURft/? 
'HN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the Ht^- day of August, 1996, true and correct copies of 
the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. Herschel Bullen, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, at 39 Exchange Place, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 and to 
Ms. JoAnn B. Stringham, Uintah County Attorney, at 152 East 100 North, Vernal, UT 
84078. 
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IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
LONI DELAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UINTAH COUNTY, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 960800088 CV 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The Plaintiff has filed a Motion for New Trial, pursuant to Rule 59 (a)(7) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The Court has considered the Supplemental Memorandum, prepared and 
filed by the Plaintiff as part of and consideration for the Court's review of it's prior Order. 
The Court has carefully reviewed the Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum and the 
Response of the Defendant. 
The Ruling of the Court will remain the same. That is, the Court will interpret the 
statute narrowly. In order to award counsel fee's under the statute will require that all 
charges be dismissed or result in a complete acquittal. 
DATED this / 7 day of September, 1996 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the / / day of September, 1996, a true and correct copy 
of the above Ruling was mailed postage prepaid or hand delivered to Mr. Herschel Bullen, 
Attorney for the Plaintiff, 39 Exchange Place, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and to 
Ms. JoAnn B. Stringham, Uintah County Attorney, 152 West 100 North, Vernal, Utah 
84078. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
